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It seems to me that lawyers have two methods -of treating the subject 
of ethical standards for the prosecution and defense of criminal cases. 
On one hand we refer to the platitudes or, as Professor Starrs describes 
them, the "glittering generalities" contained in the canons. We stress 
that a trial is a search for truth, and that the lawyer is not only an ad-
vocate but also an officer of the court. We note that defense counsel owes 
"entire devotion" to the interests of his client and that he must preserve 
the confidences of his client, yet he must not be a party to fraud or 
chicane. On the other hand, lawyers are called upon to discuss and to 
resolve specific problems that arise in the trial of criminal cases, and 
these problems are frequently difficult of resolution. I submit that the 
Canons of Ethics are so vague, so ambiguous, and so contradictory that 
they are of little or no help in resolving these problems, and that almost 
any position, on a given issue, can reasonably be defended with support 
from the canons. Perhaps a good example is the question whether it is 
proper for the lawyer to advise his client concerning the law before he 
elicits the facts. Although I hold that this practice is improper, I believe 
that it can be defended. I would point out that . Professor Freedman has 
defended this position logically and authoritatively in his recent article, 
"Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three 
Hardest Questions," published in the Michigan Law Review. 
I therefore suggest that ethical problems are more frequently than 
not resolved by the individual's notions of propriety and fair play. Mr. 
Bress has referred us to Canon 5, which states that, "The lawyer is 
bound, by all fair and honorable means, to present every defense that the 
law of the land permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of 
life or liberty, but by due process of law." That is an admirable standard, 
but who is to say what is "fair and honorable"? In the Legal Aid Agency 
for the District of Columbia the staff attorneys often seek assistance with 
respect to problems presented in their cases. In these situations we may 
have reference to the canons, but almost invariably they are of no help. 
The result is a discussion which, hopefully, leads to a consensus of what 
is "fair and honorable." That, I submit, is the best that can be done 
• Mr. Bowman is the Deputy Director of the Legal Aid Agency for the District of 
Columbia. 
28 
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT: AN ATTORNEY'S VIEWPOINT 29 
until the standards are clarified; however, this is a very disturbing state 
of affairs for those concerned about the proper administration of criminal 
justice and the effective defense of those accused of crime. Some other 
individual's notions of fair play, because they differ from mine, may 
enable him to render more effective assistance to his clients. This un-
fortunate state of affairs is bound to continue until more specific guide-
lines are established. 
With these general observations in mind, I turn to our hypothetical 
case. This is a rape case and the complaining witness refuses to speak 
with defense counsel prior to trial, saying that the prosecutor "said to 
call the police if anyone tampered with me." Now, whatever the 
prosecutor actUally said to her, it seems clear that she was given to under-
stand that defense efforts to interview her would constitute improper 
"tampering." This, of course, is not only improper but would constitu.te 
a due process violation under the recent case of Gregory v. United States/ 
which held that the prosecution may not advise witnesses that they should 
speak with defense representatives only in the prosecutor's presence. 
The second point concerns the prosecutor's failure to reveal a witness 
to defense counsel. In the federal system he is permitted to do this, but 
only if the witnesses have no information which might be considered 
favorable to the defense.2 In the hypothetical it seeems there is an old 
man whose recollection of what the defendant said as he got out of the 
complainant's auto tends to contradict the complainant's testinlOny. I 
submit that the prosecutor h~::; a duty to advise defense counsel of a 
witness whose testimony wiil tend to impeach that of a key prosecution 
wimr:ss, and that this duty exists prior to trial. In that connection, I 
would hold that the F.B.I. record of convictions of a government witness 
is the sort of helpful information which should be made available to 
the defense under Brady. This record is easily accessible to the prosecu-
tion in this jurisdiction, but M present is not being made available to 
the defense except in situations where the court compels disclosure. 
Question one inquires "how 'would you conduct the defense" under 
the facts given. I have no difficulty at all with this one. The accused 
has consistently maintained his innocence to me, and I should tender 
him as a witness and conduct his defense with vigor notwithstanding 
my doubts about his truthfulness. I would also tender the witness Jones 
whose testimony regarding the lack of chastity of the complaining witness 
is relevant to the qLle5tion of consent. The fact that the young lady's 
reputation suffers is one of the unfortunate consequences of the law 
1. Case No. 19.599. US. Court of Appeals (D.C. Cir., 28 July 1966) (not reported). 
2. Brady v. Marybnd, 3B U.S. 83 (1963). 
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which makes this type of evidence relevant when consent is interposed 
as a defense. 
Question two is difficult. The defendant has admitted guilt~ and 
counsel knows that there was no consent on the part of the complainant. 
In this situation I would point out that the defendant has every right to 
go to trial, at which trial I would vigorously cross-examine the govern-
ment witnesses even though I may know they are Felling the truth. This 
is proper because the government always bears the burden of p~oof, and 
attacking and discrediting government witnesses is simply one means of 
putting the government to its proof. For the same reason, I would tender 
the witness Jones. His testimony is not false, although, given my knowl-
edge of the facts, I am aware that there was no consent and Jones' 'testi-
mony creates the impression that there was consent. Again, this is proper 
because the government bears the burden of proof as to each' element 
of the crime, including lack of consent, and, although I have a clear duty 
not to present any false testimony, I may properly present truthful testi-
mony which tends to undermine the prosecution's case. Presenting Jones' 
testimony is little different from discrediting a government witness, whose 
testimony I may know to be true, on the basis of prior conviction for 
crime. 
However, I would advise the defendant that I cannot permit him 
to testify falsely because of my ethical obligations and because he would 
be committing perjury. Occasionally, defendants nevertheless insist on 
testifying. In these cases my practice is to seek leave to withdraw from 
the case immediately. The court is generally reluctant to grant leave to 
withdraw, although my failure to present reasons for my request- pre-
sumably makes it clear that I have ethical difficulties. If my request is 
denied, I will renew it immediately prior to trial before the trial judge. 
If again denied, and being unable to dissuade the defendant from testify-
ing--and clearly he cannot be prevented from testifying-I would be 
inclined to present his testimony in the same fashion I would any other 
witness. In these circumstances counsel has attempted twice to fulfill his 
obligation to the court, and the court, cognizant of the reason for the 
request, has twice declined to relieve counsel of his obligation to his 
client. I do not believe it is proper for defense counsel to present the 
defendant's testimony in a fashion that may lead the jury to conclude 
that counsel does not believe his client.' I repeat, however, that it would 
be clearly improper for counsel to present any other witness whose testi-
mony he knows is not the truth. 
Question three presents the situation in which the defendant main-
tains his innocence but wishes to plead guilty to a lesser charge. In our 
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hypothetical situation, the prosecutor will reduce a capital offense to 
one carrying a maximum sentence of six months for a guilty plea. It 
seems to me that the defendant should be entitled to enter the plea. The 
recent opinion in McCoyv. United States,3 said that the court has dis~ 
cretion to accept a guilty plea notwithstanding the fact that the accused 
does not concede his guilt. Therefore, counsel in our hypothetical should 
advise the defendant that the latter mayariempt to enter a plea of guilty 
to assault and battery, and that the plea may be accepted if counsel points 
. out to the court that the evidence against the defendant is sufficient to 
justify a jury verdiCt of guilty. However, counsel should also advise his 
client that the· plea may not be accepted without an acknowledgment 
of guilt, whereupon the latter may suggest that he can tell the court he 
is guilty even though this is not true. . 
. This is a very dlfficult problem. I believe that the law in this area 
is wrong, that a defendant should have an absolute right to enter a plea 
to a lesser charge with the advice of competent trial counseL As an 
illustration, I recall a case where a woman of about forty-five years was 
charged with second-degree murder. The offense is punishabie by life 
imprisOnment. The prosecution's case rested mainly on a confession, 
the admissibility or which was in doubt. On the morning· of trial the 
prosecutor suggested that she might plead guilty to simple assault, which 
is punishable by a ter~ of not more than one year. I had previously 
advised the defendant not to plead guilty to manslaughter or to assault 
with a dangerous weapon on the occasions when these dispositions were 
offered to her, because I believed I could exclude her confession and also 
felt that she had acted in self-defense. She did, however, have a previous 
conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon. I advised her that I 
believed I could obtain an acquittal, but that I would permit her to enter 
a plea to simple assault. She decided to do so, and stated to the court 
that she was guilty of simple assault. Her sentence was six months. 
3. 363 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
